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We investigate small firms’ capital structure, employing a proprietary database containing 
financial statements of Dutch small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) from 2003 to 2005. 
We find that the capital structure decision of Dutch SMEs is consistent with the pecking order 
theory: SMEs use profits to reduce their debt level, and growing firms increase their debt 
position  since  they  need  more  funds.  Furthermore,  we  document  that  profits  reduce  in 
particular short term debt, whereas growth increases long term debt. This implies that when 
internal funds are depleted, long term debt is next in the pecking order. We also find evidence 
for the maturity matching principle in SME capital structure: long term assets are financed 
with long term debt, while short term assets are financed with short tem debt. This implies 
that  the  maturity  structure  of  debt  is  an  instrument  for  lenders  to  deal  with  problems  of 
asymmetric information. Finally, we find that SME capital structure varies across industries 
but firm characteristics are more important than industry characteristics. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The  capital  structure  decision  is  one  of  the  most  important  decisions  faced  by  firm 
management. While many studies tackle the capital structure decision, most empirical work 
deals with large publicly listed firms which often have several types of securities traded (see 
Fama and French, 2002 or Frank and Goyal, 2008 for a recent review). Small unlisted firms, 
however, make up for more than 90% of all existing firms, and are the engine of growth in 
most economies. In this paper we study the factors that determine the capital structure of 
small unlisted firms in the Netherlands and investigate the role of both industry and firm 
characteristics. The capital structure decision of small firms comes closest to the standard 
textbook case which considers the choice between debt and equity. Indeed, small Dutch firms 
typically only decide from which banks to borrow and do not face other complicating issues 
like the choice between private and public debt, or which type of securities to issue. While 
previous studies on industry effects focused on larger firms, studying industry characteristics 
for small firms is particularly important as small firms typically are less diversified and more 
likely to be single-line businesses. 
 
We exploit a large and detailed database with financial statements of Dutch SMEs from 2003 
to 2005. One of the unique features of the database is its sheer size. In our analysis, we use an 
unbalanced  panel  that  contains  103,217  firm-year  observations  covering  eight  different 
industries over three years, which is much more compared with previous studies. The data set 
contains  many  very  small  firms,  which  distinguishes  this  study  from  earlier  SME  capital 
structure studies that have medium sized firms in their data (Michaelas et al., 1999; Sogorb-
Mira, 2005). Data on the smallest firms is typically difficult to obtain and therefore this is an 
excellent opportunity to investigate the capital structure of small firms. SME capital structure 
has been investigated before for other European countries, for example the U.K. (Michaelas et 
al., 1999), Spain (Sogorb-Mira, 2005), and Belgium (Heyman et al., 2008). Dutch SMEs have 
been considered together with a number of other European countries in a study of Hall et al. 
(2004).  
 
The  Dutch  case  is  particularly  interesting,  because  compared  to  the  U.S.  and  the  U.K., 
financial  markets  are  much  less  accessible  for  small  businesses.  Banks  are  the  major 
financiers  for  SMEs  while  the  banking  sector  in  the  Netherlands  is  among  the  most 
concentrated in the world (see e.g. Cetorelli and Gambera, 2001).  Our data set enables us to   2 
investigate whether the empirical results in the Netherlands are different from the results in 
other  countries  and  from  those  of  large  firms.    An  additional  interesting  feature  of  our 
proprietary data set is that we can test whether the SME capital structure reflects industry 
differences (see also Michaelas et al., 1999). This allows us to study to what extent the impact 
of firm characteristics on capital structure varies across industries, so we can test whether the 
predictions  of  the  pecking  order  theory  or  trade-off  theory  are  equally  important  for  all 
industries.  Moreover,  we  test  whether  industry  is  more  important  for  capital  structure 
compared  to  firm  characteristics.  Previous  studies  such  as  Balakrishnan  and  Fox  (1993), 
Bradley et al. (1984), and MacKay and Phillips (2005), amongst others, have found various 
impacts of inter-industry and intra-industry effects for large publically listed firms. In line 
with Michaelas et al. (1999), we study inter-industry effects of capital structure for unlisted 
SMEs, but link them closer to the importance of the pecking order theory and trade-off theory. 
 
Our findings can be summarized as follows. First, we show using panel data techniques, that 
the capital structure decision for Dutch SMEs is consistent with the predictions made by the 
pecking order theory which is in line with previous findings for, for example, the Spanish 
market (see Sogorb-Mira, 2005). SMEs use profits to reduce their debt level since they prefer 
internal funds over external funds. However, if a firm is growing, it increases its debt position 
since it needs more funds. Furthermore, we document that profits affect in particular short 
term debt, whereas growth affects long term debt. This implies that when internal funds are 
depleted, long term debt is next in the pecking order. We also document that short term debt is 
more expensive and can be amortized easily.  
 
Second, transaction costs play an important role for SMEs, along with the loss of control if 
external funds are used. However, for SME financing, information asymmetry between the 
firm  and  the  lender  is  very  important  as  well.  This  study  confirms  that  both  long  term 
collateral (tangible fixed assets) and short term collateral (inventories) are the most important 
factors for SME capital structure. It is difficult for lenders to assess the level of risk attached 
to SMEs and therefore they require collateral to limit their losses in the event of borrower 
default. We do find that SMEs with collateral face few problems to attract external finance. 
Moreover, we document that intangible assets and net debtors, which are often considered 
poor collateral, have a positive effect on the long term debt level, suggesting that banks are 
able to employ these assets in their loan granting decisions.  In addition, Dutch SMEs have a 
relatively large amount of long term debt which is more risky for lenders.   3 
 
Third, we find evidence for the maturity matching principle (see e.g. Mitchell, 1991). Long 
term assets are financed with long term debt, while short term assets are financed with short 
tem debt. In addition, larger firms have relatively more long term debt and less short term 
debt. This implies that lenders use debt maturity as a way to mitigate risk. Smaller firms are 
often more risky and therefore they have more short term debt. This also implies that debt 
maturity is an instrument for lenders to deal with problems of asymmetric information (see for 
example Ortiz-Molina and Penas, 2006). The differences between the short term and long 
term debt coefficient are statistically significant and economically relevant.  This is in contrast 
with previous studies (see for example Van der Wijst and Thurik, 1993) that find that if total 
debt  is  taken  into  account,  most  firm  characteristics  have  insignificant  effects,  since  the 
effects of long term debt and short term debt cancel out. 
 
Finally,  we  document  that  SME  capital  structure  varies  across  industries.  Although  all 
relationships discussed above are consistent for each industry separately, the economic impact 
differs across industries. We find that debt levels vary across industries which are partially 
rooted  in  industry  characteristics  that  are  not  measured  by  the individual  firm’s  financial 
characteristics.  Furthermore,  the  impact  of  profitability  on  leverage  differs  substantially 
across industries showing that the pecking order theory is more at work in some industries 
(i.e. retail trade non-food and wholesale trade). We conclude however that firm characteristics 
are more important than industry characteristics in explaining SMEs capital structure.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we review the literature and 
formulate  hypotheses.  Section  3  presents  the  data  as  well  as  the  applied  panel  data 
methodology. We discuss the empirical results in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Formulation 
 
Modigliani  and  Miller  (1958)  started  the  capital  structure  debate  by  showing  that  capital 
structure is irrelevant for firm value. In the vast stream of literature following Modigliani and 
Miller, the irrelevance proposition has been rejected, but a conclusive answer on what factors 
make capital structure relevant has not been provided yet.  Several theories have emerged to 
explain capital structure (see Harris and Raviv, 1991 for a review). The first theory is the 
pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Myers, 1977) which builds upon asymmetric   4 
information between managers and investors.  Firms prefer funding from sources with the 
lowest  degree  of  asymmetric  information  since  borrowing  costs  increase  when  obtaining 
funds from outside lenders who do not have complete information on the borrowers. The 
implication of the pecking order theory is that firms opt for internally generated funds (a form 
of inside equity), then for debt, and only as a last resort, for outside equity. This theory also 
states that there is no optimal debt to equity ratio. The second theory is the trade-off theory 
which argues that firms balance the tax benefits of debt and the costs of financial distress (see 
e.g. Brennan and Schwartz, 1978; DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980, and Bradley et al., 1984). 
These costs increase in the degree of leverage. Firms then try to move towards the optimal 
ratio when taking decisions on their capital structure. Finally, the market timing theory of 
Baker and Wurgler (2002) states that management will raise equity in hot equity markets but 
issue debt in cold equity markets. However, for our research the trade-off theory and the 
pecking order theory are most relevant as SMEs are typically privately held. Our empirical 
tests will therefore focus on these two theories.  
 
The trade-off theory and the pecking order theory have a number of predictions regarding the 
debt-equity choice (see also Heyman et al., 2008). The predictions related to the two theories 
are  summarized  in  Table  1  and  are  further  discussed  below.  Next,  we  formulate  explicit 
hypotheses and also make a distinction between the impacts for short term debt and long term 
debt. 
 
Table 1: Capital structure theory and expected sign on leverage for explanatory variables. 
        Trade-off theory  Pecking order theory 
Firm Size   +  + 
Collateral  +  + 
Profitability   +  − 
Growth opportunities  −  + 
 
Firm size is considered as an inverse proxy of bankruptcy costs. The trade-off theory predicts 
a positive relationship between firm size and leverage, because size is assumed as a proxy for 
earnings volatility and larger firms are generally more diversified and show less volatility 
(Fama  and  French,  2002).  Less  volatile  earnings  reduce  indirect  bankruptcy  costs  and 
therefore  firms can take on more debt. The pecking order theory  also  predicts a positive   5 
relationship between firm size and leverage, because more diversification and less volatile 
earnings  mitigate  information  asymmetry  problems.  This  decreases  the  costs  of  debt 
compared to other sources of finance and therefore it is more likely that debt will be used. 
Several empirical studies indeed find a positive relationship (Van Dijk, 1997; De Jong, 1999; 
Fama and French, 2002). Studies that investigate SMEs draw the same conclusion (Michaelas 
et al., 1999; Cassar and Holmes, 2003; Sogorb-Mira, 2005) and Hall et al. (2004) report this 
relationship for Dutch SMEs. Hence, the first hypothesis is: 
 
Larger firms have a higher leverage (H1).  
 
The  effect  of  firm  size  for  short  term  debt  in  particular  has  been  pointed  out  by several 
authors. Michaelas et al. (1999) and Hall et al. (2004) report a significant negative effect of 
size on short term leverage, although the effect on total leverage is still positive. Sogorb-Mira 
(2005) finds the same effect, but the results for short term debt are not significant. Ortiz-
Molina and Penas (2006) investigate the maturity structure of lines of credit and conclude that 
size  has  a  positive  impact  on  maturity.  The  high  business  risk  and  informational  opacity 
increase if firms are smaller. Therefore small firms have to rely more on short term debt. 
Additionally,  higher  transactions  costs  (Michaelas  et  al.,  1999)  and  the  relatively  weak 
bargaining position towards banks and other debt providers could explain the use of short 
term debt. We therefore formulate the following hypotheses:   
 
Firm size is positively related to long term debt (H1a).  
Firm size is negatively related to short term debt (H1b).  
 
The firm’s asset structure is a second factor that determines capital structure. Asset tangibility 
is assumed to be positively correlated with debt. One way to measure tangibility of assets is 
collateral. Collateral reduces agency problems with debtholders. It reduces bankruptcy costs 
and  credit  risk,  because  in  case  of  bankruptcy  the  debtholders  can  sell  off  the  collateral. 
Therefore, the trade-off theory predicts a positive relationship between collateral and the debt 
level. Collateral also reduces the problem of information asymmetry and therefore also the 
pecking order theory implies a positive influence. De Jong (1999) for example, confirms the 
positive  relationship  whereas  Titman  and  Wessels  (1988)  report  a  negative  relationship, 
although  not  statistically  significant.  The  information  asymmetry  argument  is  particularly 
relevant for SMEs since they are more informationally opaque than large firms. For example,   6 
small firms do not have to provide audited financial statements and these statements do not 
have to be published. Moreover, small businesses do not issue traded securities. For these 
reasons,  collateralized  lending  is  important  for  SMEs.  This  can  be  asset  based  lending, 
factoring, fixed-asset lending or leasing. All these types of lending have in common that the 
granted amount does not primarily depend on the creditworthiness of the entire firm, but on 
the value of the underlying asset. This decreases the problem of informational opacity, since 
the value of the collateral can be determined quite well by outsiders and stays relatively stable 
over time (Berger and Udell, 2006). Michaelas et al. (1999) and Sogorb-Mira (2005) find a 
positive effect of tangible assets on the debt ratio for SMEs. Hall et al. (2004) report a positive 
relationship  for  Dutch  SMEs,  although  it  is  relatively  small.  Therefore,  our  hypothesis 
regarding asset structure is:    
 
Collateral has a positive effect on the debt ratio (H2).  
 
The impact of collateral on short term and long term debt has been studied before in the 
empirical literature. For short term debt a negative relationship is reported while for long term 
debt a positive relationship is found (Van der Wijst and Thurik, 1993; Michaelas, 1999; Hall 
et al. 2004; Sogorb-Mira, 2005). In the same line of reasoning Ortiz-Molina and Penas (2006) 
argue that collateral and maturity are substitutes in reducing agency problems. This is based 
on their result that collateral has a positive impact on loan maturity.  Although collateral has a 
stronger  impact  on  long  term  debt,  it  still  has  a  positive  effect  on  short  term  debt.  We 
therefore supplement hypothesis 2 with:   
 
Collateral has a stronger positive effect on long term debt than on short term debt (H2a). 
 
Liquidity is a second dimension of the asset structure of  a firm.  Liquidity measures the 
potential to meet short term debt obligations. An illiquid firm will be restricted in attracting 
debt,  since  bankruptcy  costs  are  high.  The  trade-off  theory  therefore  predicts  a  positive 
relationship between liquidity and the debt level. We employ the variable ‘net debtors’ to test 
for  the  relationship  between  leverage  and  liquidity.  It  is  particularly  interesting  for  SME 
capital structure because small firms generally put less pressure on collecting payments from 
customers.  These late payments are often offset by late payments to creditors (trade credit). 
Trade credit is an important way to finance late payments. In the pecking order, trade credit 
may be on top of the preference list. Suppliers are willing to allow trade credit since they have   7 
a  particular  informational  advantage  compared  to  banks  regarding  the  liquidity  of  their 
customers, which alleviates the information asymmetry problem (Berger and Udell, 2006). 
However, firms cannot delay their payments to creditors beyond a certain point so it can be 
expected that short term debt will be increased if a firm suffers from late payments. Short 
term  debt  comes  next  in  the  pecking  order.  Therefore  net  debtors  has  been  used  as  a 
determinant by Michaelas et al. (1999) and they report positive coefficients for short term 
debt and long term debt, although the effect on long term debt is negligible. These results give 
rise to the next hypotheses:              
 
Net debtors is positively related to the debt level (H3). 
Net debtors has a stronger positive relationship with short term debt than with long term debt 
(H3a).  
 
Agency theories and the pecking order theory model the influence of profitability on capital 
structure. The free cash flow theory of Jensen (1986) states that more debt should be used if 
profits increase: debt truncates the free cash flow and makes it less likely that a manager starts 
value  destroying  investment  projects.  Therefore  a  positive  relationship  between  debt  and 
profitability  is  expected.  The  pecking-order  theory  predicts  the  opposite  effect  of  profits. 
Retained earnings are on top of the preference list to finance investments so profits reduce the 
necessity to  raise debt.  Studies using large  company  data confirm a negative relationship 
between debt and profitability (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Van Dijk, 1997; Fama and French, 
2002) as predicted by the pecking order model. SME oriented studies also support the pecking 
order  relationship (Van  der Wijst and Thurik, 1993; Michaelas et  al., 1999; Sogorb-Mira 
2005). The pecking-order relationship applies to SMEs, because the agency conflict between 
managers and shareholders does not exist for most SMEs and therefore overinvestment is 
unlikely to happen.  Therefore the next hypothesis is: 
 
Profitability is negatively related to leverage (H4). 
 
Since hypothesis 3a predicts that SMEs rely more on short term debt, it can be expected that 
profitability is related to the maturity structure of debt as well. Michaelas et al. (1999) find a 
bigger effect of probability on long term debt compared to short term debt. They argue this is 
because SMEs prefer short term financing and long term debt will be reduced if internal 
funding is available. On the other hand, long term debt cannot be amortized easily and short   8 
term debt has higher interest rates. This implies a bigger influence on short term debt and this 
is validated by several SME studies (Van der Wijst and Thurik, 1993; Cassar and Holmes, 
2003;  Sogorb-Mira,  2005).  Therefore,  hypothesis  4  is  supplemented  with  the  following 
statement:    
 
Profitability has a greater negative impact on short term debt than on long term debt (H4a).   
 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977) the agency problems between 
managers  and  debtholders  particularly  apply  to  firms  with  growth  opportunities.  Myers 
(1977),  for  example,  argues  that  managers  may  neglect  many  value  creating  projects 
(underinvestment), because equityholders do not earn a profit from all projects if interest 
payments are high. Therefore the trade-off theory predicts a negative relationship between the 
debt level and growth opportunities. A different relationship with short term debt is suggested 
by Myers (1977). Short term debt could overcome the underinvestment problem and would 
therefore be positively affected by growth while the effect of total debt remains negative. The 
pecking-order theory predicts a positive effect of growth on leverage. Firms with plenty of 
growth  opportunities  are  more  likely  to  raise  new  funds  than  firms  without  growth 
possibilities (De Jong, 1999). Debt is preferred over equity so a positive relationship between 
growth and debt is predicted. Growth opportunities are often estimated with the amount of 
R&D expenses, the market-to-book ratio or the relative amount of intangible assets. Titman 
and Wessels (1988) are the first to consider growth opportunities and use several proxies to 
test it. They report a negative relationship for both long term debt and short term debt. Fama 
and French (2002) find a negative relationship between R&D expenses and leverage. Their 
explanation is that growing firms want to keep debt levels low such that they have a low risk 
debt capacity in the future. This financial flexibility argument is confirmed by Graham and 
Harvey  (2001)  in  their  CFO  survey  study.  Another  reason  for  a  negative  relationship  of 
growth opportunities could be that assets needed for future growth are poor collateral. SME 
studies find evidence for a positive relationship of debt with expected future growth. Sogorb-
Mira (2005) and Michaelas et al. (1999) use the amount of intangible assets as a proxy for 
growth opportunities and both studies find positive and significant coefficients. Sogorb-Mira 
(2005) reports a stronger positive effect of growth opportunities on long term debt, but a 
negative impact on short term debt. Michaelas et al. (1999) find a positive impact on short 
term debt. For growth, SMEs rely more on short term debt, because of severe information 
asymmetry problems. Past or current growth in sales or assets is often used as a proxy for   9 
growth opportunities. De Jong (1999) argues that current growth signals that the firm is in an 
expanding market and has the ability to grow in the future. 
 
Growth opportunities positively relate to leverage (H5).  
 
We also briefly discuss expected impacts from taxation and industry effects (the expected 
effects are not included in Table 1, however). Miller and Modigliani (1963) have argued that 
firms prefer debt financing because of the tax shield so a positive relationship between the tax 
rate and leverage can be expected. Jordan et al. (1998), Michaelas et al. (1999) and Sogorb-
Mira (2005), however, find the opposite relationship for SMEs. An explanation could be that 
the  tax  status  of  a  company  is  not  informative.  Sogorb-Mira  (2005)  argues  that  SME 
managers chose other instruments to lower their tax payments. Jordan et al. (1998) argue that 
especially for SMEs, taxes negatively affect debt levels simply because taxes lower retained 
earnings. The total tax burden of a firm is not solely determined by the tax rate, but by taxable 
income as well. Some authors argue this is even more important than testing the tax rate itself 
(Van Dijk, 1997). Interest payments reduce taxable income, but other items can do the same. 
These non-debt tax shields could substitute the tax shield of debt (Titman and Wessels, 1988). 
Hence, a negative relationship with the debt ratio is expected. Titman and Wessels (1988) did 
not  report  a  statistically  significant  impact.  Fama  and  French  (2002)  report  a  significant 
negative relationship for large firms and other studies find the same result for SMEs (Van der 
Wijst and Thurik, 1993; Heshmati, 2001; Sogorb-Mira, 2005). Michaelas et al. (1999) find a 
positive  relationship  for  SMEs,  but  their  results  were  not  statistically  significant.  In  the 
empirical section below, we will also test for tax effects but do not formulate an explicit 
hypothesis.  
 
The empirical investigation of industry effects deals with the question to what extent capital 
structure variation between firms is explained by industry characteristics compared to firm 
characteristics. In their study, Balakrishnan and Fox (1993) find that 52% of capital structure 
variation is explained by firm effects and 11% by inter-industry differences. MacKay and 
Phillips (2005) report similar percentages for firm and inter-industry effects. However, they 
also investigated intra-industry effects and these effects account for 33% of capital structure 
variation.  Michaelas  et  al.  (1999)  use  industry  fixed  effects  to  test  a  hypothesis  whether 
industry effect have an influence on SME capital structure. They find significant coefficients 
for  industry  dummies  but  the  impacts  are  primarily  on  short  term  debt.  Many  industry   10 
attributes could be captured by the firm specific characteristics discussed earlier, but some are 
not. We will investigate whether industry effects are important in the capital structure choice 
of  SMEs  and  link  it  back  to  the  importance  of  the  two  capital  structure  theories  for  the 
different industries.  
 
3. Description of the Data and Research Methodology  
 
3.1 Description of the Data 
 
The  data  we  employ  have  been  kindly  provided  by  Rabobank,  a  large  Dutch  financial 
institution. The database, managed by an independent research institute, contains financial 
statements of the bank’s SME clients. Many clients, particularly if they have a loan, have to 
provide  their  balance  sheet  and  income  statement  every  year.  Rabobank  is  active  in  all 
industries, provinces, and grants loans to many small firms. The data set can therefore be 
considered as representative for the Dutch setting.  
 
Firms are included in the data set when they have less than € 20 million annual sales over the 
period 2002-2005, and when they report at least two annual accounts within this period.
3 This 
implies the data is an unbalanced panel. While the bank is active in all industries, the data set 
does not contain firms active within the agricultural sector, and the energy and utilities sector. 
Additionally, we removed financial firms from the database as is commonly done in capital 
structure  studies:  financial  institutions  are  imposed  to  capital  requirements  and  may  have 
inherently  a  different  capital  structure.  Moreover,  associations  (e.g.  sport  clubs,  political 
organizations, labour unions) are removed, because they do not have commercial activities 
and often rely on governmental funding. Finally, we remove all entries with data errors.  Our 
data set contains 103,217 firm-year observations. We noticed that the number of observations 
in 2005 decreased substantially (with more than 30%) compared to 2003 and 2004, which is 
probably caused by the way the data was collected. Whether this decline in observations has 
an impact on the empirical results, is investigated in the robustness section 4.3 below. 
 
                                                       
3 In the analysis, all observations for 2002 are lost because it was needed to calculate the growth variable as 
discussed below.   11 
The dependent variable of the analysis is capital structure. The most commonly employed 
measure is the total debt ratio, i.e. the relative amount of debt (leverage), defined as total debt 
over  total  assets.  We  also  consider  the  short  term  and  long  term  debt  ratio  separately. 
Definitions and descriptive statistics are given in Table 2. Debt is measured by its book value. 
Market values are not known for SMEs and most entrepreneurs and most SME managers will 
base their financing decisions on book values. Table 2 shows that Dutch SMEs have much 
more long terms loans than short term loans (80% of total debt is long term debt). This is in 
contrast to Hall et al. (2004) who report an average long term debt level of just 2% for Dutch 
SMEs. The numbers in Table 2 are also different from statistics reported for other countries. 
Sogorb-Mira (2005) reports that for Spanish SMEs 15% of total debt is long term debt and 
Michaelas et al. (1999) find that for UK SMEs the ratio is 29% (in 1995). It is important to 
note that the maturity of debt does not tell anything about the flexibility of the interest rate. 
Although many loans of the SMEs in our data set are long term loans, interest rates are often 
flexible. 
 
The  following  firm  characteristics  enter  as  determinants  of  capital  structure:  firm  size, 
tangible  fixed  assets,  net  debtors,  profitability,  intangible  assets,  asset  growth,  effective 
corporate  tax  rate  and  depreciation.  The  inclusion  of  these  variables  is  based  on  our 
hypotheses and past empirical studies, as documented in Section 2. Table 2 also provides 
descriptive statistics on our independent variables. Firm size is measured as the log of total 
assets. Total assets is the most common proxy for size in the empirical literature. A measure 
for asset structure is tangible assets. Tangible assets are all fixed assets except intangible fixed 
assets and excluding inventories (see Titman and Wessels, 1988; Sogorb-Mira, 2005). As 
opposed to real estate and equipment, inventories are short term assets and therefore expected 
to be poor collateral. Net debtors is measured by the difference between debtors and creditors, 
scaled by total assets (Michaelas et al. 1999). Table 2 shows that the firms in our sample can 
be characterised by having much more tangible than intangible assets. In addition, on average 
net debtors is small. Profitability is defined as earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation 
(EBITD).  The  profit  numbers  of  non-incorporated  business  are  corrected  for  an  owner’s 
wage.
4 Depreciation is not deducted in all empirical studies, but if the aim is to test how 
managers change their debt position with profits, managers will very likely take into account 
                                                       
4 Net profit (before tax) of non-incorporated firms has been adjusted with a proxy for the average Dutch 
income for a small business director, which is € 40.000.   12 
the cash position. Moreover, depreciation is already used as a measure for non-debt tax shield. 
To measure the effect of profitability, we use return on assets (ROA), which is defined as 
EBITD scaled by total assets. The proxy for growth opportunities is the relative amount of 
intangible assets (Michaelas, 1999; Sogorb-Mira, 2005). Intangible assets refer to assets that 
are  expected  pay  off  in  the  future,  such  as  brand  names,  goodwill  or  research  and 
development expenses.  Current growth is measured by the relative  yearly change in total 
assets. As a result, all observations for 2002 are lost, which implies that the first year of our 
analysis is 2003. 
 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics 
Definition Mean Std. Dev. Median Maximum Minimum
Total debt  short term debt/total assets 0.387 0.260 0.388 1.585 0
Long term debt  long term debt/total assets 0.307 0.252 0.284 1.452 0
Short term debt  total debt/total assets 0.080 0.116 0.027 1 0
Size (log) log of total assets 6.075 1.351 6.078 11.382 0.693
Tangible assets tangible fixed assets/total assets 0.485 0.287 0.494 1 0
Net debtors  (debtors - creditors)/total assets 0.046 0.146 0.018 0.587 -0.534
ROA EBITD/total assets 0.158 0.320 0.133 7.286 -14.000
Intangible assets  intangible assets/total assets 0.017 0.067 0.000 1 -0.144
Growth (assets) (tot.assets (t) - tot.assets (t-1))/total assets(t-1) 0.134 0.436 0.018 3.300 -0.600
Tax rate Taxes paid/earnings before tax 0.095 0.265 0 4.054 -3.998
Depreciation depreciation expense/total assets 0.080 0.071 0.061 3.500 0 
Notes: The amount of taxes paid is not directly observed. The amount is derived by multiplying the return on 
equity (which is based on profits after tax) by the amount of equity. This gives the profits after taxes. Deducting 
this for the profits before tax, gives an implied measure of taxes paid. 
 
The effective corporate tax is measured as the amount of company taxes divided by the profit 
before tax.  This variable is not scaled by total assets, since the amount of taxes depends on 
profits. Non-debt tax shields lower taxable income and can therefore substitute for the tax 
benefits of debt. Titman and Wessels (1988) introduced depreciation as a proxy for non-debt 
tax shields, but did not find significant effects. A problem with depreciation as a proxy for 
non-debt tax shields is that it can also be an indicator for fixed assets. Van Dijk (1997) reports 
a  high  correlation  (i.e.  0.495)  between  depreciation  and  fixed  assets.  Since  he  finds  a 
significant  negative  relationship  between  depreciation  and  leverage  he  argues  that  it  is 
unlikely that a firm’s collateral value (for which depreciation can be a proxy as well) has a 
positive influence on leverage. Nevertheless, depreciation is used by many other empirical 
studies (e.g. Fama and French, 2002; Sogorb-Mira, 2005). 
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3.2 Econometric model    
 
We employ panel data analysis to test the capital structure theories as our data set includes 
observations over several years. Some firms appear twice while others appear for all four 
years, which makes the dataset unbalanced.                                                                                                                              
 
We index all variables with an  i for the individual
5 ( N i ,..., 1 = ) and a  t for the time period 
( T t ,..., 1 = ). The general static panel data regression model can then be written as 
 
(3.1)       T t N i x y it it it ,..., 1   and   ,..., 1       ,
'
0 = = + + = ε β β , 
 
Where  it x  is a K-dimensional vector of explanatory variables, which does not contain an 
intercept term. This model imposes that the intercept  0 β  and the slope coefficients in  β  are 
identical for all individuals and time periods.  
 
A frequently employed panel data model assumes that  it i it u + =α ε where  it u  is assumed to be 
homoskedastic  and  not  correlated  over  time.  The  component  i α   is  time  invariant  and 
homoskedastic across individuals. In our empirical analysis however we use the fixed effects 
model because it is most appropriate for two reasons. First, the fixed effects model introduces 
an individual-specific intercept term that could capture specific entrepreneurial skills or many 
other factors that could make a small firm unique. Berger and Udell (2006) argue that the 
management capabilities of the entrepreneur are a crucial factor in SME financing. Banks take 
into account the track record of the entrepreneur and their personal  relationship with the 
entrepreneur if they grant a loan. It is expected that these arguments are particularly relevant 
for the database used in this research, since this database contains many very small firms. 
These firms often have no or just a few employees and the entrepreneur does not devote much 
time  to  financial  control.  Furthermore,  the  data  covers  almost  all  sectors  of  the  Dutch 
economy (see above). Hence, the sample cannot be considered a random sample from a much 
larger population of industries. Several SME capital structure studies use a fixed effects panel 
data model as well (Van der Wijst and Thurik, 1993; Michaelas et al. 1999; Sogorb-Mira, 
                                                       
5 While we refer to the cross-sectional units as individuals, in our empirical section below they refer to 
firms and industries respectively.   14 
2005). Second, in addition to an intuitive economic reasoning, the nature of the unobserved 
effects has been statistically verified with a (not reported) Hausman test. This test rejects the 
null hypothesis that the explanatory variables and the individual effects are uncorrelated. A 
fixed effects model can cope with correlation between explanatory variables and individual 
effects and therefore it is statistically preferred (see also Verbeek, 2008, pp. 367-369).        
 
In a fixed effects regression model it is assumed that all it x  are independent of all  it u . The 
regression model includes N dummy variables for the individual intercepts. That is, 
 
(3.2)       T t N i u x d y it
N
j
ij j it it ,..., 1   and   ,..., 1      ,
'
1
= = + + =∑
=
β α ,   
 
where  j i dij = =   if   1  and 0 elsewhere. We thus have a set of N dummy variables in the model. 
The  implied  estimator  for  β   is  referred  as  the  least  squares  dummy  variable  (LSDV) 
estimator.  A  model  like  this  will  include  many  dummy  variables  which  makes  it 
computationally unattractive. However, the same  β  estimator is retrieved if the regression is 
performed in terms of deviations of individual means. Note that:  
 
(3.3)       N i u x y i i i i ,..., 1      ,
'
= + + = β α .       
 
Consequently it can be written that:  
 
(3.4)       T t N i u u x x y y i it i it i it ,..., 1   and   ,..., 1       ), ( ) (
' = = − + − = − β .   
 
This is a regression model in deviations from individual means and does not include the 
individual  effects.  The  OLS  estimator  for  β   is  called  the  within  estimator  since  it 
concentrates on differences within a firm, not between firms and it is exactly identical to the 
LSDV estimator described in equation (3.2) above.    15 
4. Empirical Results  
 
Section 4.1 discusses the main results of our regressions using the full sample.  For every firm 
characteristic the corresponding hypotheses are reviewed and the outcome is compared with 
earlier  studies.  The  results  of  the  industry  tests  are  discussed  in  section  4.2.  Section  4.3 
provides the results of  several  robustness checks, while in Section 4.4 we summarize all 
findings.     
 
 4.1 Full Sample Estimates 
 
The results of the firm fixed effects panel data regressions for total debt, long term debt and 
short term debt are reported in the second, fourth and sixth column of Table 3, respectively.  
 
Table 3: Leverage: Fixed Effects Panel Regressions with Firm Characteristics 
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
Size (log) 0.099 * 29.803 0.105 * 34.116 -0.006 * -3.293
Tangible assets  0.463 * 62.392 0.486 * 69.040 -0.023 * -5.665
Intangible assets  0.412 * 16.521 0.457 * 19.929 -0.045 * -4.764
Net debtors  0.200 * 28.325 0.080 * 13.051 0.120 * 24.685
ROA -0.137 * -22.840 -0.053 * -11.703 -0.084 * -22.433
Growth (assets) 0.018 * 12.642 0.017 * 13.170 0.000 0.124
Tax rate  -0.009 * -6.302 -0.006 * -4.186 -0.003 * -4.071
Depreciation 0.165 * 8.129 0.072 * 4.069 0.093 * 7.224
adj. R
2 0.296 0.325 0.048
Total debt  Long term debt Short term debt
 
Notes: This Table provided the estimation results for equation (3.4) using the complete sample. A ‘*’ indicates 
the estimate is significant at the 1 % level. Variable definitions are presented in Table 2. 
 
In  all  three  models  most  of  the  individual  parameters  are  statistically  significant.  The 
estimates presented in Table 3 confirm hypothesis H1. Larger firms have higher leverage. A 
one standard deviation change in log size implies a 13.4 percentage point increase in total 
debt. In addition, hypotheses H3a and H3b are confirmed as well. The coefficient for size in 
the long term debt regression is significantly positive, while for the short term debt regression 
it is significantly negative. This shows that larger firms rely more on long term finance and 
use less short term finance, although the increase in long term debt outweighs the decrease in 
short term debt. These results are in line with previous studies on SMEs (see for example Van 
der Wijst and Thurik, 1993 and Soborg-Mira, 2005). Larger firms are more aware of better 
financing methods since they employ more financial and administrative staff and may have a   16 
stronger bargaining position towards lenders. It is not likely that larger firms have more debt 
because they have more collateral, since the correlation between size and tangible assets is 
very low (-0.01).  Long term debt is more risky for a lender and therefore firm size is used as 
a proxy for this risk. Larger firms are often more diversified and have a known track record 
which enables a lender to make a better assessment of the risks involved.  
 
Strong support is found for hypothesis H2 concerning the positive relationship between debt 
and collateral: a one standard deviation increase in tangible assets implies a 13.3 percentage 
point increase in total debt. Collateral is very important for SMEs since it helps to overcome 
informational problems. The positive effect on total debt is almost entirely explained by the 
effect on long term debt, as short term debt is just marginally affected by collateral. Since 
collateral appears to be the best way to mitigate risk of SMEs, these firms can fully use their 
collateral to attract long term debt. For the firm, the costs of long term debt are lower because 
banks are charging (relatively) higher interest rates on short term loans. These findings are in 
accordance with the maturity matching principle that long term assets are financed with long 
term financing and short term assets are financed with short term funds.  
 
There is also strong support for hypotheses H3 and H3a. Net debtors, financed with both long 
term and short term debt, positively affect the debt level. The empirical results show that the 
effect is larger for short term debt. This also provides evidence for the maturity matching 
principle. The positive coefficient for long term debt probably relates to a fixed amount in the 
debtors level that is relatively stable over time. That fixed amount can be used to attract long 
term debt. Since net debtors affect both long term and short term debt, it can be argued that 
net debtors is a measure for liquidity of the firm and therefore a proxy for firm risk. Firms 
with a low net debtors ratio will have lower debt ratios (ceteris paribus): a one standard 
deviation decrease in net debtors lowers the debt ratio with about 3 percentage points. 
 
Profitability is negatively related to the total debt ratio and this supports hypothesis H4. A one 
standard deviation increase in ROA lowers the total debt ratio with 4.4 percentage points. 
Debt levels are lower if a firm generates profits. This suggests that SME managers prefer 
internal financing first, as predicted by the pecking order theory. The most likely reason is 
that they want to stay in control and avoid debt as much as possible (Vos et al., 2007). This 
result shows that the agency problem of free cash flow is nonexistent in SMEs, because they 
do not have public equity and typically ownership is concentrated. The negative relationship   17 
between profitability and debt applies both to long term debt and short term debt, but the 
effect on short term debt is larger. This provides support for hypothesis H4a and is consistent 
with previous studies by Van der Wijst and Thurik (1993), Cassar and Holmes (2003) and 
more recently Soborg-Mira (2005) for Spanish data. Short term debt can be amortized easily. 
Moreover, it implies that more profitable firms are allowed to take on more long term debt. 
Our findings are contrary to the result of Michaelas et al. (1999) who argue that small firms 
would prefer short term debt and would therefore use profits to reduce long term debt.   
 
Support for the pecking order theory is also provided with the results of growth opportunities 
and asset growth. Firms with a lot of intangible assets have less short term debt. If intangible 
assets are considered to be a good proxy for growth opportunities, SMEs are very well able to 
finance their future growth with long term debt. It is however important to note that many 
firms in the database have no intangible assets on their balance sheet (see Table 2). Therefore, 
is has to be taken into account that although the coefficients for tangible and intangible assets 
are almost the same, in an economic sense tangible assets are more important.   
 
The agency theory of Myers (1977) is not supported by the results for growth opportunities.  
The  underinvestment  theory  argues  that  if  the  expected  return  does  not  reach  a  certain 
threshold level, the firm does not invest. This threshold level is more difficult to reach if 
interest payments are high. However, SME managers do not stick to a particular required 
return and sometimes invest in projects that are not very profitable for them. Firm continuity 
plays  an  important  role  in  the  investment  decisions  of  SMEs  and  therefore  the 
underinvestment problem of Myers (1977) does not apply to Dutch SMEs.  
 
The results for asset growth do not change the conclusion drawn for hypothesis H5. The 
coefficients on asset growth are low, but a positive effect of asset growth on long term debt is 
found. Therefore, our empirical results support hypothesis H5, which is in line with Michaelas 
et al. (1999). In the period under investigation (2002-2005) the average total assets per firm 
has increased. The growth in total assets is mainly due to an increase in fixed assets which 
implies that firms invested more and could attract external financing for this.  However, in the 
same period, interest rates have declined making it likely that firms used that opportunity to 
opt for long term loans. Unfortunately, the effect of loan rates can not be studied more in 
depth due to data availability.   
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The results in Table 3 indicate that the tax rate has a significant, but economically negligible 
effect on total debt and long term debt. Firms not exposed to corporate taxation have to pay 
the standard Dutch rate of 30%. Therefore the model implies that at this tax rate the long term 
debt ratio of SMEs will decrease by 0.18% (ceteris paribus) while the short term debt ratio 
decreases with 0.09% (ceteris paribus). This finding is in line with the results of Michaelas et 
al. (1999) who also report negative, but small effects of taxes. A possible explanation is that 
high taxes stem from high profits, which in turn decreases the need for debt (Jordan, et al., 
1998). This effect is small since the Netherlands has a proportional tax system with an upper 
limit for the tax rate. 
      
The second measure of the tax effect, depreciation, shows significant positive coefficients. 
This is in line with previous findings for large firms by Fama and French (2002) and SMEs by 
Sogorb-Mira (2005).  However, Van Dijk (1997) mentions that depreciation is probably not a 
suitable measure for non-debt tax shields. He suggests depreciation is a measure for fixed 
assets and is positively correlated with collateral. This correlation is positive, but small (0.10). 
Therefore, depreciation is not a substitute for collateral. Another explanation could be that 
depreciation measures the amount of investments required to maintain the fixed assets in 
place. If depreciation is high, the assets have to be replaced quicker which requires financing. 
   
Overall, we do not find that Dutch SMEs take into account corporate taxation in their capital 
structure decision. It is important to note that many firms in our database do not have to pay 
corporate taxes. The most likely reason for the nonexistence of a tax effect is the desire of 
SME owners to stay in control and avoid a bank’s involvement in their business (Vos et al., 
2007).  A reduced tax bill probably does not outweigh the interest payments and loss of 
control.  
 
Summarizing,  the  empirical  evidence  shows  that  economically  the  most  relevant  firm 
characteristics  for  both  total  debt  and  long  term  debt  are  firm  size  and  tangible  assets. 
Profitability and inventories are economically most relevant in explaining variation of short 
term debt.  
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4.2 Investigating industry effects 
 
In this section we employ two approaches to show that there are capital structure differences 
across industries. First, we estimate the fixed effects model with firm characteristics for each 
industry  separately  and  test  whether  there  is  significant  cross-sectional  variation  in  the 
estimated  coefficient  for  each  firm  characteristic.  This  helps  us  to  study  which  capital 
structure theories are most relevant for which industries. Second, equation (3.4) is estimated 
using  industry  fixed  effects.  This  answers  the  question  to  what  extent  the  industry 
classification itself does affect capital structure.   
 
We confirm that all the conclusions regarding the hypotheses are the same for all industries 
individually,  suggesting  that  the  pecking  order  theory  is  most  relevant  for  all  industries 
studied. The industry sample regressions compute a coefficient for every firm characteristic 
per industry (see Table A1 in the Appendix). Variation in these coefficients implies whether 
the  relationship  between  a  firm  characteristic  and  capital  structure  can  differ  in  sign  and 
magnitude  across  industries,  providing  insights  on  the  relevancy  of  the  capital  structure 
theories for different industries. The standard deviation of the cross section of the individual 
estimates for the eight different industries is used as a measure for this variation. The results 
of the industry sample regressions are compared with the general model. Table 4 presents the 
estimates for the variation measure as well as the results for individual Wald tests. These tests 
investigate whether all the coefficients for a firm characteristic are equal across industries. If 
the Wald test hypothesis is rejected, the relationship is different for at least one industry. 
 
The test results indicate that for most firm characteristics the relationship with the debt level 
varies significantly across industries. This variation (measured with the standard deviation) is 
particularly large for net debtors and intangible assets. Net debtors show high coefficients for 
both  retail  industries  (food  and  non-food)  (see  the  individual  industry  estimates  in  the 
appendix below). This implies that liquidity is relatively more important in these industries. 
On average, retail firms have negative net debtors, since most customers pay in the shop while 
suppliers are paid on credit. The differences in the estimates for intangible assets are difficult 
to explain as it not exactly clear what is captured with this variable. It is likely that in the 
manufacturing industry R&D represents a large part of the intangible assets whereas in the 
services industry it is represented by goodwill. The estimate for intangible assets, reported in 
Table A1 in the Appendix, is particularly large for wholesale trade. For the transport industry   20 
the relationship is small, but this can be explained by the fact that firms in this industry have 
very low average intangible assets.  
 
Table 4: Industry Effects and Leverage: Variation of Parameter Estimates across Industries 
St. dev. of Wald test St. dev. of Wald test St. dev. of Wald test
Estimates Estimates Estimates
Size (log) 0.013 * 3.442 0.022 * 8.113 0.014 * 6.243
Tangible assets  0.045 * 4.269 0.053 * 5.539 0.036 * 13.291
Intangible assets  0.100 * 3.492 0.092 * 3.648 0.037 * 2.616
Net debtors  0.103 * 17.557 0.079 * 14.419 0.049 * 7.465
ROA 0.058 * 21.806 0.039 * 14.108 0.024 * 8.529
Growth (assets) 0.004 0.540 0.003 0.867 0.002 1.009
Tax rate  0.001 1.317 0.002 * 3.956 0.001 1.209
Depreciation 0.072 1.429 0.080 * 2.762 0.028 0.701
Total debt  Long term debt Short term debt
 
Notes: This table presents the standard deviation of the estimates for 8 industries in addition to Wald tests that 
indicate  whether  the  individual  estimates  are  the  same  across  industries.  A  ‘*’  indicates  that  the  standard 
deviation of the industry cross section of estimates is significant at the 1% level. Definitions of all variables are 
presented in Table 2. 
 
Tangible assets is the most important firm characteristic in all industries (see Table A1 in the 
Appendix).  Leisure  & catering has  a much smaller estimate, because banks consider this 
sector as very risky. Collateral is often poor, since most restaurants and cafés do not own real 
estate and pay relatively high rents. The results show that manufacturing, construction and 
transportation firms have the strongest coefficients for tangible assets. This can be explained 
by the fact that, on average, these industries have good collateral.       
 
The effect of profitability on leverage is particularly high in the wholesale trade, retail trade 
non-food and transport sectors, see Table A1 in the appendix, revealing that the pecking order 
theory is more at work in those industries. Also note that the catering and leisure industry is 
the only industry in which the effect on long term debt is larger than on short term debt. 
Profits reduce long term debt more than short term debt. This is possibly due to the high 
industry risk as discussed earlier. Interest rates on long term debt are higher compared to other 
industries, making short term debt relatively more attractive. Another reason could be that 
banks urge these firms to reduce their long term borrowing because of the high business risk.  
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While the effect of profitability is significantly different across industries, the effect of growth 
is not. This implies that the impact of the difference in relevancy of the pecking order theory 
across industries only stems from profitability and not growth.   
 
The second part of our study on industry impacts investigates industry fixed effects, without 
adding other firm control variables. Table 5 shows the results of a regression of industry 
dummies only on firm debt levels, where the dummy for the manufacturing industry has been 
omitted. The estimates should be interpreted as the difference in the average debt level of a 
particular industry with the manufacturing industry.  
 
Table 5: Industry Effects and Leverage: Dummy variable coefficient of average debt ratios for 
eight industries.  
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
Manufacturing Omitted Omitted Omitted
Construction -0.057 * -18.516 -0.049 * -16.678 -0.008 * -6.101
Wholesale trade -0.026 * -7.956 -0.056 * -18.658 0.031 * 19.522
Retail trade food 0.080 * 16.568 0.082 * 17.445 -0.002 * -1.163
Retail trade non-food 0.062 * 21.082 0.027 * 9.406 0.036 * 25.542
Catering & leisure 0.131 * 37.309 0.150 * 43.059 -0.018 * -13.595
Transport  0.109 * 27.914 0.122 * 32.235 -0.013 * -9.077
Services -0.035 * -11.866 -0.025 * -8.745 -0.010 * -8.140
adj. R
2 0.062 0.070 0.033
Total debt  Long term debt Short term debt
 
Notes: This table presents estimates of a model with industry dummies only. The manufacturing industry is 
treated as the constant. The average total debt level in the manufacturing industry is 0.370, 0.296 for long term 
debt and 0.074 short term debt. A ‘*’ indicates the estimate is significant at the 1 % level. 
 
All differences in debt ratios across industries are statistically significant. The adjusted R
2 
shows that 6.2% of the cross-sectional variance in total debt ratios is explained by industry 
classification only. For long term debt the explained variance is 7% and for short term debt 
3.3%.  Clearly,  for  all  three  debt  measures  this  is  less  than  the  regression  with  firm 
characteristics (29.6%, 32.5% and 4.8% respectively such as presented in Table 3 above), but 
for the short term debt ratio the difference is very small. These results indicate that there is 
more variation in leverage ratios within the industry than across industries which is in contrast 
with earlier findings by Bradley et al. (1984). In their analysis, 54% of the variation in debt 
ratios is explained by the industry classification. Note however that their results are based on 
data from publicly listed firms. 
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Next, we run an industry  fixed effects panel regression where  we now also include firm 
characteristics. The results of Table 6 show that industry characteristics do have an effect on 
capital  structure,  but  this  effect  could  very  well  be  explained  by  difference  in  the  firm 
characteristics particular to that industry. Differences in industries are partially captured by 
differences in firm characteristics. For example, the transport industry is known for its high 
amount of fixed assets, whereas an average wholesale trade firm has relatively more liquid 
assets. The table provides the estimates for the industry fixed effects panel regressions with 
firm characteristics. 
 
Table 6: Leverage: Fixed Effects Panel Regressions with Firm Characteristics and Industry 
Fixed Effects 
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
Manufacturing Omitted Omitted Omitted
Construction -0.038 * -14.714 -0.024 * -10.582 -0.014 * -10.100
Wholesale trade 0.032 * 11.452 0.003 1.351 0.028 * 18.277
Retail trade food 0.023 * 5.655 0.021 * 5.448 0.002 1.201
Retail trade non-food 0.091 * 34.143 0.058 * 24.767 0.032 * 22.795
Catering & leisure 0.006 ** 2.056 0.016 * 5.603 -0.010 * -7.186
Transport  0.015 * 4.551 0.022 * 7.149 -0.007 * -4.593
Services -0.032 * -12.860 -0.021 * -9.421 -0.011 * -8.509
adj. R
2 0.338 0.424 0.070
Total debt  Long term debt Short term debt
 
Notes: This table presents the results of a regressing including firm characteristics and industry characteristics. 
Only the estimates for the industry dummies are presented. A ‘*’, ‘**’ indicates the estimate is significant at the 
1%, 5% level respectively. 
  
From the estimates in Table 6, it is clear that differences in firm characteristics cannot explain 
the difference in industry fixed effects on SME capital structure. This is evidence that some 
other characteristics of an industry are important determinates of the SME debt ratio. For 
example,  the  competitive  position  of  a  firm  within  an  industry  could  very  well  be  an 
important factor for capital structure (see for example MacKay and Phillips, 2005).  
 
The  industry  with  the  strongest  fixed  effect  is  retail  trade  non-food.  This  industry  has  a 
leverage ratio that is above average, while important firm characteristics such as profitability 
and collateral are below average. They retail food industry is known for its low equity ratio 
since it is an extremely competitive industry. This is probably the reason why higher debt 
ratios are observed.   
     23 
4.3 Robustness checks  
 
We now document the results of several robustness checks. When describing the data it has 
been mentioned that for reasons not known to us, for 2005 there are more than 30% fewer 
observations compared to 2004 and 2003. This decline in observations may lead to biased 
empirical results if there was a systematic drop of particular firms in the sample. Although 
there are much fewer observations, the distribution of firms across industries in 2005 is not 
different from the other years and the proportion of firms with negative equity is the same in 
all four years. Therefore, at first glance the 2005 data should not cause any problems. As a 
formal test, a fixed effects model has been estimated that includes interaction terms of all firm 
characteristics with a 2005 dummy. The results are reported in Table 7.    
 
Table  7:  Leverage:  Fixed  Effects  Panel  Regressions  with  Firm  Characteristics  and  2005 
Interaction Dummies 
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
Size (log) 0.103 * 24.760 0.108 * 27.742 -0.005 ** -2.124
Tangible assets  0.459 * 52.657 0.479 * 58.052 -0.020 * -4.241
Intangible assets  0.402 * 13.685 0.447 * 16.414 -0.045 * -4.108
Net debtors  0.203 * 24.809 0.083 * 11.567 0.120 * 21.525
ROA -0.135 * -19.717 -0.051 * -9.633 -0.085 * -20.082
Growth (assets) 0.017 * 10.838 0.017 * 10.938 0.000 0.471
Tax rate  -0.008 * -4.951 -0.005 * -3.216 -0.003 * -3.255
Depreciation 0.156 * 6.738 0.066 * 3.200 0.090 * 5.986
Size × 2005 -0.010 -1.420 -0.007 -1.146 -0.003 -0.661
Tangible assets × 2005 0.013 0.787 0.022 1.403 -0.009 -1.010
Intangible assets × 2005 0.030 0.550 0.029 0.578 0.001 0.061
Net Debtors × 2005 -0.012 -0.756 -0.010 -0.707 -0.002 -0.208
ROA × 2005 -0.009 -0.636 -0.011 -1.020 0.002 0.180
Growth × 2005 0.000 -0.103 0.001 0.440 -0.002 -1.030
Tax rate × 2005 -0.004 -1.146 -0.003 -0.868 -0.001 -0.577
Depreciation × 2005 0.034 0.716 0.023 0.590 0.010 0.356
adj. R
2 0.296 0.325 0.049
Total debt  Long term debt Short term debt
 
Notes: Definitions of all variables are presented in Table 2. 2005 indicates a dummy variable equal to 1 when the 
observation stems from 2005, and 0 otherwise. A ‘*’, ‘**’ indicates the estimate is significant at the 1%, 5% 
level respectively.  
 
All the interaction terms in Table 7 are insignificant. A Wald test to test if all 2005 interaction 
terms are jointly significant is rejected. Therefore we conclude that the results are robust in 
the time dimension. 
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A second robustness check is related to the tax effect. Only incorporated firms have to pay 
corporate taxes so for many firms no taxes are reported in the database. To ensure this does 
not bias the results, an interaction term has been added to the regressions. This interaction 
term consists of a dummy variable that is 1 for incorporated firms and 0 otherwise. This 
dummy  is  multiplied  with  the  tax  rate  variable.  The  results  of  the  firm  fixed  effects 
regressions with the tax interaction term are reported in Table 8.  
 
Table 8: Leverage: Impact of Taxes and Incorporated firms 
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
Tax rate  -0.028 ** -2.018 -0.019 -1.392 -0.010 * -2.852
Tax rate × Incorporated 0.018 1.435 0.013 0.999 0.007 1.948
adj. R
2 0.296 0.325 0.049
Total debt  Long term debt Short term debt
 
Notes: Only the estimates for the tax rate effects are presented. A ‘*’, ‘**’ indicates the estimate is significant at 
the 1%, 5% level respectively. A definition of tax rate is presented in Table 2. Incorporated indicates a dummy 
variable that is 1 for incorporated firms and 0 otherwise.  
 
The effect of tax on the debt level is not statistically significant for incorporated firms and the 
coefficients are economically negligible.  Therefore, the conclusions drawn earlier regarding 
the relationship between tax and leverage are robust.  Also for incorporated firms no tax effect 
has been found. 
 
The final robustness check concerns the maturity matching principle. The results as discussed 
in  section  4.1  indicate  that  this  principle  applies  to  SME  capital  structure.  However,  the 
results of the regression for short term debt show primarily negative estimates. The positive 
estimate  for  net  debtors  implies  a  very  small  economic  impact.  The  maturity  matching 
principle states that short term assets are financed with short term assets and therefore the 
variable inventories, another short term asset, is added to the regressions. Previous studies 
such  as  Titman  and  Wessels  (1988)  and  Michaelas  et  al.  (1999)  consider  inventories  as 
tangible  fixed  assets,  but  if  the  maturity  matching  principle  is  true,  inventories  should 
positively relate to short term debt and have no significant relationship with long term debt 
since inventories are a short term asset. For tangible fixed assets this effect is reversed. The 
results for the firm fixed effects regressions with inventories are presented in Table 9. 
 
The coefficients for inventories are significant for short term debt but insignificant for long 
term  debt.  In  the  short  term  model  inventories  are  now  the  most  important  factor.  This   25 
provides more evidence for the maturity matching principle. Moreover, the adjusted R
2 for the 
short term debt model increased from 4.8% to 6.7% which implies that more of the variation 
in the short term debt ratio is explained by this extended model. The adjusted R
2 for long term 
debt is similar to the model which does not include inventories as explanatory variable. 
 
Table  9:  Leverage:  Fixed  Effects  Panel  Regressions  with  Firm  Characteristics  including 
Inventory 
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
Size (log) 0.105 * 31.459 0.106 * 33.943 0.000 -0.195
Tangible assets  0.495 * 66.044 0.488 * 67.254 0.008 ** 1.974
Net debtors  0.219 * 30.847 0.081 * 13.081 0.137 * 28.409
ROA -0.136 * -23.002 -0.053 * -11.693 -0.083 * -22.543
Intangible assets  0.436 * 17.403 0.458 * 19.927 -0.022 ** -2.363
Inventories 0.206 * 14.378 0.011 0.851 0.195 * 20.110
Growth (assets) 0.020 * 14.160 0.018 * 13.210 0.002 * 2.830
Tax rate  -0.009 * -6.217 -0.006 * -4.182 -0.003 * -3.987
Depreciation 0.163 * 8.071 0.072 * 4.076 0.092 * 7.125
adj. R
2 0.302 0.325 0.067
Total debt  Long term debt Short term debt
 
Notes:  A  ‘*’,  ‘**’  indicates  the  estimate  is  significant  at  the  1%,  5%  level  respectively.  Definitions  of  all 
variables are presented in Table 2. 
 
4.4 Summary of the Empirical Results  
 
The  hypotheses  and  the  results  of  the  regressions  with  firm  characteristics  have  been 
summarized in Table 10.   
 
Table 10: Overview of the Hypotheses and the Empirical Results 
Hypothesis Result Hypothesis Result Hypothesis Result
Size of the firm  + + + + - -
Collateral + + ++ ++ + -
Net debtors + + + + ++ ++
Profitability  - - - - -- --
Growth opportunities  + + + + + -
Current growth  + + + + + 0 ns
Taxes rate   + - - -
Non debt tax shield  - + - + -- +
Industry effects ≠ 0 + ≠ 0 ++ ≠ 0 +
Total debt Long term debt Short term debt
 
Notes: This table provides an overview of the tested hypothesis, where ‘ns’ indicates not statistically significant. 
A double sign (-- or ++) indicates that if the signs for long term debt and short term debt are the same, the 
coefficient is more pronounced (in absolute values) compared to the other debt category. 
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Overall, the empirical results are in favour of the pecking order theory. The results show that 
firms prefer internal funding, because profits are negatively related to debt. Profitability has a 
stronger effect on short term debt, which implies long term debt is preferred over short term 
debt. In the pecking order retained earnings are on top of the preference list, followed by long 
term debt and finally short term debt. The results for growth also support the pecking order 
theory. The effect is relatively small, but growth has a positive effect on debt, particularly 
long term debt. These results contradict the predictions of the trade-off theory. Moreover, the 
trade-off theory is rejected since no evidence for the tax effect is found. The corporate tax rate 
has no significant effect on leverage and for depreciation positive coefficients are reported. 
  
The results also demonstrate the importance of the maturity structure of debt. Except for 
taxes, all the remaining estimates differ significantly between short term debt and long term 
debt. This implies the maturity structure is an instrument for lenders to deal with information 
asymmetry  problems  (see  for  example  Ortiz-Molina  and  Penas,  2006).  This  result  is 
contradicting previous findings by Van der Wijst and Thurik (1993). They show that if total 
debt is taken into account, most firm characteristics have non-significant effects, since the 
effects of long term debt and short term debt cancel out. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper provides empirical evidence on capital structure decisions of Dutch small firms 
using  a  large  proprietary  panel  data  set.  We  find  empirical  evidence  that  supports  the 
predictions of the pecking order theory. SMEs use profits to reduce their debt level, since they 
prefer internal funds over external funds. However, if a firm is growing, it increases its debt 
position because it needs more funds and our results show that this happens according the 
pecking order theory. Furthermore, profits particularly affect short term debt, whereas asset 
growth only affects long term debt. Therefore, after internal funds, long term debt comes next 
in the pecking order for SMEs. Short term debt is more expensive and can be amortized 
easily.  
 
The empirical results imply that industry does matter for capital structure. We find empirical 
evidence  that  the  pecking  order  theory  is  more  at  work  in  the  retail  trade  non-food  and 
wholesale trade sectors. Moreover, industry classification has significant effect on  capital 
structure as well. Hence, debt levels vary across industries and this is partially rooted in   27 
particular industry features not measured by firm financial characteristics. Nevertheless, firm 
financial characteristics are much more important than industry characteristics. 
 
The pecking order theory has been developed by Myers (1984) stemming from problems of 
asymmetric information between managers and shareholders, but this interpretation does not 
hold for SMEs. For unlisted firms, transaction costs play an important role, along with the 
loss of control if external funds are used. Instead, information asymmetry between the firm 
and its lender is very important for SME financing. This study shows that both long term 
collateral (tangible fixed assets) and short term collateral (inventories) are the most important 
factors. Lenders require collateral as it is difficult to assess the risk of an SME and collateral 
reduces their possible loss in case of default. If collateral is available, no evidence has been 
found that Dutch SMEs are confronted with problems to attract finance, since the effect of 
collateral on the debt level is large. Moreover, also intangible assets and net debtors, which 
are often considered as poor collateral, have a positive effect on the long term debt level. In 
addition, Dutch SMEs have a relatively large amount of long term debt which is more risky 
for lenders.  
 
To conclude, our empirical results also imply that it is important to take into account the 
maturity of debt when investigating SME capital structure. An examination of total debt only, 
will not provide the whole picture. The maturity matching principle is essential for SME 
capital structure. If financed by debt, long term assets are financed with long term debt and 
short term assets are financed with short tem debt. We also document that firm size also 
affects the maturity structure. Larger firms have relatively more long term debt and less short 
term debt. This implies that lenders use the maturity of debt as a way to mitigate risk. Smaller 
firms are often more risky and therefore they have more short term debt.       
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Appendix 
Table A1: Results from the industry specific regressions  
This Table presents the results of regression 3.4 for separate industry samples. The results are displayed per firm 
characteristic.  
Panel A: Size Coefficients
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
Manufacturing 0.106 * 11.431 0.104 * 11.851 0.002 0.499
Construction 0.12 * 15.681 0.116 * 17.332 0.004 0.855
Wholesale trade 0.069 * 8.333 0.076 * 10.245 -0.006 -1.193
Retail trade food 0.109 * 4.705 0.132 * 6.092 -0.023 ** -2.485
Retail trade non-food 0.101 * 12.193 0.099 * 12.619 0.002 0.399
Catering & leisure 0.14 * 11.303 0.17 * 14.399 -0.03 * -5.683
Transport  0.101 * 10.453 0.109 * 11.01 -0.008 -1.657
Services 0.081 * 11.846 0.086 * 13.433 -0.005 -1.374
Panel B: Tangible Assets Coefficients
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
Manufacturing 0.482 * 23.786 0.508 * 25.989 -0.026 ** -2.372
Construction 0.513 * 31.934 0.524 * 35.477 -0.012 -1.188
Wholesale trade 0.440 * 18.997 0.498 * 24.039 -0.058 * -4.330
Retail trade food 0.456 * 12.900 0.479 * 12.485 -0.023 -1.242
Retail trade non-food 0.380 * 21.134 0.471 * 27.210 -0.091 * -8.304
Catering & leisure 0.371 * 14.964 0.347 * 14.572 0.024 ** 2.157
Transport  0.496 * 16.289 0.518 * 17.120 -0.022 -1.811
Services 0.498 * 32.039 0.493 * 32.703 0.006 0.719
Panel C: Net Debtors Coefficients
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
Manufacturing 0.192 * 9.895 0.081 * 4.481 0.111 * 9.410
Construction 0.188 * 13.582 0.050 * 4.412 0.138 * 14.065
Wholesale trade 0.264 * 16.098 0.079 * 6.046 0.185 * 13.161
Retail trade food 0.384 * 8.130 0.177 * 3.862 0.206 * 6.506
Retail trade non-food 0.319 * 16.679 0.163 * 9.852 0.156 * 10.916
Catering & leisure 0.288 * 6.430 0.219 * 5.124 0.068 * 2.558
Transport  0.237 * 7.211 0.151 * 4.199 0.086 * 5.199
Services 0.118 * 8.073 0.037 * 2.942 0.081 * 8.697
Panel D: ROA Coefficients
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
Manufacturing -0.180 * -12.665 -0.067 * -4.833 -0.113 * -11.096
Construction -0.107 * -10.181 -0.020 * -2.704 -0.087 * -11.574
Wholesale trade -0.247 * -15.614 -0.095 * -7.937 -0.152 * -13.031
Retail trade food -0.142 * -4.389 -0.044 * -1.548 -0.097 * -5.460
Retail trade non-food -0.222 * -12.981 -0.095 * -7.405 -0.127 * -10.383
Catering & leisure -0.109 * -6.094 -0.066 * -4.798 -0.043 * -3.771
Transport  -0.200 * -7.729 -0.104 * -4.547 -0.096 * -6.131
Services -0.095 * -7.837 -0.039 * -4.117 -0.055 * -8.711
Total debt  Long term debt Short term debt
Total debt  Long term debt Short term debt
Total debt  Long term debt Short term debt
Total debt  Long term debt Short term debt
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Table A1 (continued): Results from the industry specific regressions  
Panel E: Intangible Assets Coefficients
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
Manufacturing 0.469 * 5.357 0.524 * 7.022 -0.055 ** -2.044
Construction 0.492 * 6.936 0.519 * 7.800 -0.027 -1.282
Wholesale trade 0.690 * 11.846 0.697 * 13.231 -0.007 -0.210
Retail trade food 0.303 * 2.621 0.442 * 4.171 -0.139 * -3.776
Retail trade non-food 0.399 * 5.369 0.525 * 7.884 -0.126 * -4.337
Catering & leisure 0.322 * 4.987 0.352 * 5.703 -0.031 -1.113
Transport  0.135 0.930 0.100 0.705 0.035 0.453
Services 0.331 * 7.966 0.351 * 9.321 -0.020 -1.252
Panel F:Growth Coefficients
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
Manufacturing 0.012 * 2.987 0.015 * 3.613 -0.002 -1.207
Construction 0.020 * 5.532 0.020 * 6.092 0.000 -0.168
Wholesale trade 0.013 * 3.358 0.013 * 3.901 -0.001 -0.330
Retail trade food 0.008 0.754 0.013 1.277 -0.005 -1.190
Retail trade non-food 0.024 * 7.237 0.026 * 7.895 -0.002 -0.732
Catering & leisure 0.016 * 4.158 0.016 * 4.160 0.000 0.283
Transport  0.016 * 3.896 0.016 * 3.545 0.000 0.108
Services 0.018 * 6.191 0.014 * 4.880 0.004 * 3.014
Panel G: Tax Rate Coefficients
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
Manufacturing -0.005 -1.364 -0.003 -0.738 -0.002 -1.399
Construction -0.012 * -2.935 -0.008 ** -2.183 -0.004 -1.600
Wholesale trade 0.001 0.366 0.005 1.332 -0.004 -1.649
Retail trade food -0.009 -1.275 0.004 0.547 -0.012 * -2.759
Retail trade non-food -0.010 * -2.721 -0.006 * -1.884 -0.003 -1.434
Catering & leisure -0.013 * -2.933 -0.010 ** -2.220 -0.003 -1.248
Transport  -0.014 ** -2.503 -0.013 ** -2.246 -0.002 -0.539
Services -0.012 * -4.565 -0.009 * -3.789 -0.003 -1.936
Panel H: Depreciation Coefficients
Estimate t-value Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
Manufacturing 0.143 ** 2.445 -0.011 -0.195 0.155 * 4.403
Construction 0.271 * 5.613 0.132 * 3.136 0.139 * 4.331
Wholesale trade 0.116 1.879 0.066 1.263 0.050 1.210
Retail trade food 0.140 1.316 0.130 1.246 0.010 0.248
Retail trade non-food 0.317 * 5.106 0.221 * 3.750 0.097 ** 2.311
Catering & leisure 0.278 * 5.658 0.231 * 5.976 0.047 1.413
Transport  0.146 1.868 0.057 0.761 0.089 * 2.658
Services 0.018 0.454 -0.071 ** -2.079 0.089 * 3.793
Total debt 
Total debt  Long term debt Short term debt
Short term debt
Total debt  Long term debt Short term debt
Long term debt Short term debt
Total debt  Long term debt
 